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Recently, the dam failure types shift from traditional causes to operational risk. Since 
the operational components have complex internal and external interactions, we take 
them into an integrated system. Moreover, the Monte-Carlo simulation method was 
applied to develop a reliability-based model to study the system performance. Our 
approach incorporates different sources of uncertainty. This model allowed us to 
evaluate the reliability and availability of the system. The system reliability analysis 
helps us understand the relationship between failure modes and safety decisions 
made. In further, the model allows experimenting on operational strategies. This 
thesis presents the framework we have developed and illustrated the results and 
analysis of our application in the Missouri River mainstem reservoir system. In 
addition, four scenarios have been applied to explicit the impacts of modeling system 
  
with different maintenance strategies. Besides, we used the stochastic time-series 
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Hydropower dams are an integral part of the world’s surface water resource system 
and provide significant social and economic benefits. However, many existing 
hydropower systems were built decades ago, and the components of these aging 
infrastructure facilities have caused increasing numbers of dam incidents or failure. 
The consequences of a dam failure can be catastrophic, resulting in immense damage 
to environmental, economic, and casualties. Common traditionally identified reasons 
of dam failure include 1) sub-standard construction materials, crack, erosion, slides, 
2) inadequate spillways, 3) geological instability, 4) extreme inflows,  5) human, 
computer or design error 6) increased external load due to unusual weather, and 7) 
earthquakes. (“Dam Failure,” 2020)In contrast, many cases indicate that failure did 
not result from the above reasons but an unfortunate and unforeseen combination of 
more or less routine things (Hartford et al., 2016).For example, a moderately high but 
no extreme inflow occurs; a sensor fails to provide a warning for an unexpected 
reason; one or more spillway gates are unavailable due to maintenance. None of these 
is particularly dangerous by itself but can lead to a failure when they occur in 
combination.  
Therefore, the safety assessment of a dam becomes more biased on how to analyze 
and evaluate operational risks for the whole system. The operation of a large and 
complex hydropower facility system requires careful management and continuous 





maintenance of hydropower systems and emergency operations required during flood 
events(Patev et al., 2017). 
Various researchers have proposed the use of stimulation employing the Monte-Carlo 
approach. This method is a numerical procedure for generating random numbers 
based on certain probability distribution ((Motevalli et al., 2015). After defining the 
uncertain variables which affect system performance, specific probability 
distributions are generated based on each variable’s inherent and natural variability. 
In each repetition of the procedure, the random combination uncertainty of inputs is 
taken into account. Consequently, this approach can resolve the uncertainty of the 
water system, services for access to the performance of reservoirs and analysis the 
reliability of hydropower systems.  
The present study uses the Monto-Carlo simulation in commercial software 
application GoldSim™. This software provides a module with reliability modeling 
and risk analysis together. In our project, we created an existing model of the 
Missouri River mainstem reservoir system based on a reliability-based method to 
investigate the performance of reservoir cascades and treat risk and uncertainty in 
operational planning. Four scenarios were tested to evaluate the effects of different 
maintenance schedules. A time-series river hydrology element was also added to the 





2. Literature Review 
The cascades are several dams in a row along a river. These involve multi-purposes 
and many uncertainties, and the computational burdens of analyzing such a system is 
a major obstacle. Nevertheless,  Karamouz & Mousavi (2003)using a method that 
included driven stochastic dynamic programming (DDSP) and Fuzzy stochastic 
dynamic programming (FSDP) to predict the uncertainty of the reservoir operation of 
Dez and Karun dams. Turgeon (2007) studied optimal multi-reservoir operation using 
stochastic dynamic programming (SDP) and Optimal Reservoir Trajectory (ORT) 
approaches. Celeste & Billib (2009)examined the optimal reservoir operation policies 
using Implicit (ISO), explicit stochastic optimization (ESO), and parameterization 
simulation optimization (PSO) approaches. Hakimi-Asiabar et al.(2010)applied self-
learning Genetic Algorithms (SLGAs to derive optimal operating policies for the 
multi-reservoir system. 
Current engineering approaches to dam safety are mostly based on probabilistic risk 
analysis (PRA). PRA primarily addresses the capability of a dam to withstand 
extreme hydrologic loads or the demands caused by earthquakes and the dam’s 
capacity to withstand resulting ground shaking (Hartford & Baecher, 2004). It 
principally considers risk as associated specific chains of events that may occur using 
event trees, but many interactions and feedbacks among the chains of events ignored.   
In recent years, the reliability-based methodology has gained recognition both in 
academics and engineering practice. In structural design, it is particularly useful for 





information concerning a certain object.(Westberg, 2010).Westberg described and 
demonstrated the capability of applying the reliability-based methodology for the 
assessment of concrete dams. Since every dam is a unique prototype, the reliability-
based analysis enables those unique characteristics to be taken into consideration and 
to reduce the uncertainties. By offering good possibilities to implement additional 
information available from investigations, testing, monitoring, etc. System reliability 
analysis is a valuable tool to define system failure modes. 
Accordingly, this methodology has also been applied to operational goals. Zhou et al. 
(2014) integrated reliability-based methods with hydro system optimization 
modeling, incorporated both qualitative and quantitative reliability analysis methods, 
and developed a model that formally treat risk and uncertainty in operations planning. 
Similar to this study.  Baecher et al. (2019) , developed an operational risk model to 
evaluate the availability of individual components and systems in order to identify 
system weakness and corrective actions relative to maintenance.  
Both Zhou et al.(2014) and Baecher et al. (2019) have applied the simulation to better 
understanding the reliability of the complex system. Moreover, Karamouz & Mousavi 
(2003) have applied simulation to study the operational uncertainty of large scale 
reservoir systems in Iran. Tilmant et al. (2014)  have applied simulation to analyze the 
performance of a stochastic dual dynamic programming (SDDP) model, which 
determines the economic value of storage in a cascade of multipurpose reservoirs in 





Monte Carlo simulation is one of the most used simulation methods, and it is 
beneficial for modeling problems with uncertainty in the inputs. For example, Sharma 
(2016) analyzed geotechnical slope stability using the Monte-Carlo method. By 
comparing it with a deterministic approach, he found that the Monte-Carlo method 
was more adaptable since the deterministic approach used input parameters assigned 
single-valued rather than using the spatial variation for these inputs. Motevalli et al., 
(2015) used Monte-Carlo simulation to analyze the operational criteria of the 
reservoirs system regarding inflow uncertainty. Meanwhile, Rohaninejad & Zarghami 
(2012) combined Monte Carlo and the finite difference method to predict the 
behavior of embankment dams after impounding. The results indicated the robustness 
of this combination method and can efficiently implement in monitoring dam 
performances.  
The Monte Carlo simulation approaches have become increasingly common in 
engineering applications involved in a variety of benefits. 1) simulation allows 
complex systems interactions to be modeled easily compared with the use of closed-
form analytical models, 2) the system can evolve into any feasible state, 3)simulation 
allows external or internal interactions readily included, and 5)the numerical 
precision of simulation results is independent of the complexity of the system being 
modeled. It depends only on iterations performed (Hartford et al., 2016).  
In a Monte-Carlo simulation, the model runs many times with uncertain variables 
sampled with different values each time. These realizations generate a probability 





on these CDFs, the risk level representing the confidence bonds (5% and 95%), mean 
or median, or any other desired level of probability can be obtained.   
GoldSim™ is a valuable tool for Monte-Carlo simulation. Except providing a more 
accurate representation of uncertainty, it allows the user to create detailed and 
accurate representations than can be achieved with even the most sophisticated risk 
and reliability methodology (A Dynamic Simulation Approach to Reliability Modeling 
and Risk Assessment Using GoldSim, 2017).  Compared to traditional approaches to 
reliability modeling, GoldSim™ has the advantage that:  
a) The external environment can be readily modeled, which can affect 
and interact with the system.   
b) It allows for complex operating rules.  
c) It allows for complex interdependencies.  
These features and capabilities contribute to GoldSim™ being powerful in creating 
realistic models. For instance, Patev et al.(2017) used GoldSim™ to model the 
behavior of the spillway and hydropower plant components during phased plant 
operations. For estimating the uncertainty of flood characteristics, Ahmadisharaf et 
al., (2018) developed a semi-distributed hydrologic model in GoldSim™ to simulate 
the rainfall-runoff process.  Goharian et al.(2017) introduce a new approach to assess 







3. Project overview 
3.1. Project purpose 
This project takes mainstream dams on the Missouri river as a cascade system. It uses 
GoldSim™ software to develop an operational reliability-based model to evaluate the 
components' performance as well as the effects of their interactions to analyze the 
operational risk in the system. Our goal is to use simulation to better understand the 
reliability of hydropower, the flow control systems, and the relationship of reliability 
to maintenance. Operational factors are important to reliability and operational 
factors, system engineering is difficult to model, and that is why a simulation 
approach was used.  
On the other hand, we followed four scenarios provided by Corps engineer (the 
owner) to examine the performance of the reservoir with different maintenance 
schedules. The Corps aims to gain the sense that how the varieties repair and 
rehabilitation periods would affect the system, how long they can take out the service 
off the turbines, and whether they need to take multiple turbines at once or at discrete 
time.  
3.2. System project location 
The Missouri River is the longest one in the united states. The system consists of six 
mainstream dams that extend from the Fork Peck reservoir in northeastern Montana 
to Gavins Point Dam in southeastern South Dakota and northeastern Nebraska 
(Master Water Control Manual, 2018). The total of the mainstream reservoirs contain 





square miles (updated in 2018). The map of the Missouri river basin is shown below 
in Figure 1:  
 
 
Figure 1: Map of Missouri river basin with the mainstem (Grigg, 2020) 











































































Table 1:Summary of location data for each dam archive from Missouri water manual  
3.3. System physical component 
This section overviews the major physical components of the six hydroelectric 
systems. The typical hydroelectric system (Figure 2) consists of a reservoir, control 
gates, penstocks, water turbines, and generators. The dam is constructed at a high 
level to ensure enough water could be stored. The height of the water level 
determines the capacity of the reservoir and how much energy can generate. The 
water flow through the penstocks to the turbines, the gates open controlled by the 
amount of water released. Then the water will continue to be taken into the turbine, 
and the turbine is mechanically coupled with electric generators. Once the kinetic 






Figure 2: Typical Hydroelectric system layout (Kiran, 2015) 
As the main component of this system, the reservoir assumes the primary goal to 
control flood storage and maintain the reliable water supply. The reservoir has a 
complex subsystem controlled by a subsystem’s various interactions. The key 
parameters for operating the reservoir are as following:  
• Water Level: it is defined as the water level measured at a specific gauge and 
at a particular time.  





• Discharge: it defined as the overall flow released from the reservoir through 
all spillway facilities, turbines of the hydropower station.  
• Storage: it described as the volume of water stored in the reservoir. 
Multiple pools for a single reservoir are defined to use for different purposes.  An 
example of a multi-pool reservoir is shown in Figure 3, and each dam’s annual 
pool-duration relationship curve can found in Appendix 8.1:  
 
Figure 3:Reservoir Pools example 
Inactive Pool: also called the dead pool. Within this level, there are no outlets to drain 
the water.  
Conservation Pool: this pool is used to store water temporarily for power generation, 
recreation, navigation, irrigation, municipal, and industrial water supply (Jason, 
2011). The top of the conservation pool varies seasonally because of additional 





Flood Control Pool: usually, this pool is to remain empty except during the times 
following a flood event. Scheduling releases from this zone is typically in a controlled 
manner of spillway gates operation.    
Surcharge Pool: this is storage reserved for the retention of extreme or unpredictable 
flood flows.  
3.4. Engineering data 
3.4.1. Fort Peck Dam 
The top of Fort peck dam elevation is 2280.5 ft in mean sea level. It contains sixteens 
40’ x 25’ vertical lift gates at the right bank, the gates are electrically operated and 
can be individually controlled from the service bridge. Design discharge capacity at 
elevation 2253.3 ft —which is the top elevation of spillway gates closed — is 
275,000 CFS. Moreover, the discharge capacity at the maximum operating pool is 
230,000 CFS.  
There are five Francis turbines inside the Fort peck dam. This type of turbine consists 
of five internal components which are 1) Sator, 2) Rotor,3) Excitor, 4) Transformers, 
and 5) Governors. See the diagram in Figure 4. All of these components work 
dependent but interact with others. It turns to be failed if one of these gets a problem. 







Figure 4: Diagram of a Francis turbine (credit: U.S.Army Corps of Engineers) 
3.4.2. Garrison Dam 
The highest elevation of Garrison is 1875 ft.  It contains 28 spillway gates and 5 
Francis type turbines. The 28 Tainter spillway gates are each 40’ wide and 29’ high, 
which contribute the design discharge capacity is 827,000 at 1858.5 ft. The crest 
elevation is 1825 ft. The discharge capacity at the maximum operating pool is 
660,000 CFS.  
3.4.3. Oahe Dam 
Oahe embankment has a top elevation of 1666.0 ft. The Oahe spillway is a remote 





size. The discharge capacity at the maximum operating pool is 80,000 CFS. The 
turbines of Oahe dam also used Francis type, and it has seven of that. 
3.4.4. Big Bend Dam 
The maximum dam height is 95ft, and the top elevation is 1440ft. There are eight 
Tainter gates control the spillway. Each tainter gate is 40 feet long and 38 feet high. 
Design discharge capacity at 1433.5ft is 390,000 CFS, and at the top of the exclusive 
flood control zone is 270,000 CFS. Eight hydraulic turbines installed in the Bid bend 
dam.    
3.4.5. Fort Randall Dam 
The dam has the top elevation at 1395ft. The spillway has 21 tainter gates controlled. 
Each gate is 40 feet long and 29 feet high. The discharge capacity of the maximum 
operating pool is 508,00 CSF, and the maximum operating pool is 1375 ft. In Fort 
Randall dam, eight Francis hydraulic turbines installed to generate power. 
3.4.6. Gavins Point Dam 
The top elevation of the Gavins Point dam is 1234ft, and the maximum operating 
pool elevation is 2250ft. The discharge capacity at maximum operating pool elevation 
is about 508,000 CFS, and 620,000 CFS at the maximum level attained during routing 
of the Spillway Design Flood (SDF). The spillway gates are fourteen 40’ x 30’ 
Tainter gates, and the turbines are three Kaplan type hydraulic turbines.                   
3.5. Current water control plan for the system 
The Missouri master water control manual describes the water control plan for the 





operational regulation during drought, flood, and regular runoff periods. The Cops 
has direct responsibility for an update of the water control plan if any possible 



















4. Development of the GoldSim™ Model 
 
We could not get adequate data on the entire system at this time, so we narrowed 
scope, the scope for a longer term is on many dams. Still, since the time limitations 
and the quality of data we had, we have only developed the model of the biggest dam 
– the Garrison dam – as our first stage of the project.  
GoldSim™ reliability module leverages the power dynamic fault tree analysis Monte-
Carlo framework.  The dynamic fault tree simulation allows the analyst to develop a 
representation to check the system’s reliability and then observe the system’s 
performance. It also allows the multiple independent failure modes to be defined for 
each component and observe the availability of the system as well as each dependent. 
In the next section, the framework for developing the reliability-based model will be 
introduced.  
Besides, we used two different ways to analyze our model. The first way is taking the 
historical data as input, and it applied to our general model plus the four scenarios. 
The other way is to replace these historical data with stochastic time-series, which has 
been developing the simulate inflow. 
4.1. Model preparation 
USACE provided us with the daily data inflow from the year 1967 to the year 2018 
which will be used as historical input. All engineering data and operation rules were 
obtained from Master Water Manual.  Our model start simulates in the year 1984 and 





data available, thus, the historical inflow data of Garrison were repeated for every 
thirty-five years.   
4.2. Reservoirs modeling 
The reservoir operated based on policies that involve multiple pools where are divided 
into surcharge, flood control, conservation, and inactive pool zones (See Figure 3). The 
property for the Garrison dam could be summarized in Table 2. 
Storage Capacities, acre-feet 
Exclusive Flood control (Elev. 1850-1854) 1,495,000 
Flood control (Elev. 1837.5-1850) 4,211,000 
Conservation zone (Elev. 1775-1837.5) 12,951,000 
Dead zone (Elev. 1673-1775)  4,794,000 
Table 2: Multiple Pool zone for Garrison dam 
Table 3 summarizes the physical water level constrains for the Garrison dam. 
 Garrison 
Initial_Pool_Elevation (ft) 1840.6 
Top_Dam_Embankment(ft) 1875 
Table 3: Physical constrains of the Garrison dam 
The difference between the upstream daily inflow and outflow of spillways and 
turbines will change the reservoir elevation. The initial storage capacity for each 
reservoir could read from the storage capacity rating table. This table was given the 





elevation, we can quickly obtain the initial storage capacity, and then the model can 
run the simulation. Contrarily, if we have data for the reservoir capacity, we can 
reverse the storage capacity table – the reservoir elevation rating table – to get the 
number for elevation.  Both storage capacity rating table and reservoir elevation 
rating table are actual daily data recorded in 2018. The amount of daily inflow may 
not be entirely stored in reservoirs, and it will go through the turbines and spillway 
gates at sometimes and then flow out to the next dam. Therefore, the simple operation 
system represented in GoldSim™ looks like in the following:  
   
Figure 5: Snapshot of the operation system in GoldSim™ 
4.3. Turbines modeling 
The power unit rating table relates to power generation as a function of discharge and 
headwater elevation. Once we know two of these parameters, we could obtain the 





At this point, we developed a correlation equation of power head and discharge. 
Surprisingly, the results fit good polynomial lines for the first top-three dams (take 
Garrison as an example, see Figure 6) but results for the bottom three dams (take Fort 
Randall as an example, see Figure 7) were unreasonable. The powerhead we 
calculated is subtracted from the lowest permanent pool zone elevation from reservoir 
elevation.  
Figure 6: Plots of Garrison Dam’s Turbine Flow Vs. Elevation and Turbine Flow Vs. 






Figure 7: Plots of Fork Randall Dam’s Turbine Flow Vs. and Turbine Flow Vs. 
Powerhead (Source: Lingyao Li) 
The results give us the confidence to study the first three dams rather than the bottom 
three dams. Each turbine generates power when the water flows out; meanwhile, 
some amount of water may flow out over the spillways. The diagram for this working 
mechanism looks like Figure 8: 
 
Figure 8: The outputs relate to Turbines 
Figure 9 shows the major components of turbines incorporated into the system 







Figure 9: Typical Turbine inner system 
4.4. Gates modeling 
The gates open to release water not only to avoid overtopping of the dam but also to 
support other authorized purposes such as downstream environmental flows. While 
the elevation reaches out to the base flood control elevation, we need the gates to 
drain. The operation rules for gates should follow two aspects: discharge and 
reservoir elevation.  
1. If the upstream daily inflow is more than the amount of turbine outflow and, 
2. The reservoir pool reaches the maximum normal operation pool level, but 
within the maximum operating pool elevation, gates opened.  
To determine how much height needs to lift for the gates is dependent on pool 
elevation and the difference between upstream daily inflow and the outflow. Spillway 
rating curve indicated the information we need for gates operation rules to ensure the 







Figure 10: Spillway rating curve example – Garrison dam 
The in-demand failures of spillway gates are complex and controlled by the gate’s 
components. The major components of the spillway gates shown in Figure 11:  
 
Figure 11: Spillway Gates inner system 





• Total_Spillway_Flow = Sum of discharge through all gates 
• Total_Turbine_Flow = Sum of discharge through all turbines 
• GR_outflow = Garrison.Total_Spillway_Flow+Garrison.Total_Turbine_Flow 
4.5. Model overview 
Figure 12 gives a graphicly view of each dam’s interaction and location. 
 
Figure 12: Missouri River Mainstem dams system model overview 
 
Since we only focus on Garrison at this time, the structure of Garrison dam 







Figure 13 Garrison Dam inner structure shown in GoldSim™ browser 
4.5.1. Reliability elements 
In our model, we choose the reliability elements – ‘function element,’ which 
continuously operates once it turned on. The default icon for our function elements 
look like this: 
 
Once we create one function element, the element’s dialog appears and requires to 







4.5.2. Logic tree 
The GoldSim™ provides two types of logic trees to define operating requirements, 
which are the ‘requirement-tree’ and ‘fault-tree.’ The former one evaluates elements 
operate in true order,  and the later one evaluates to false in order.  
Under the box of operational requirements, we have two AND-Gates – one for 
external requirements and one for internal requirements. The external requirements 
AND-Gate will be empty as initial created and refer to outside 
requirements/conditions while the internal requirements used for the 
requirements/conditions that are inside the element – such as child elements.  
 
Figure 14: Example of Requirements-tree and Fault-tree 
The spillways gates and turbines controlled by different internal components 
operations. The two figures displayed below represented the operation requirements 















Figure 16: Operation requirements for turbines 
4.5.3. Failure modes 
Each component inside the dam system interacts by one or more others. Since the 
adverse performance of each component remains uncertain, the result of their 
interaction is uncertain as well. Therefore, we introduce statistic distribution to access 
the reliability of the particular component in order to determine when the failure 
occurs.  
Weibull distribution is particularly useful to predict product life and quality than other 
statistic distributions because it can characterize a wide range of data trends, 
including increasing, constant, and decreasing failure rates (Unlocking Weibull 
Analysis, 2013). Moreover, the Weibull distribution generally provides valuable 
results to help explain the item’s failure characteristics. For example, it reveals the 
point at which the component will have failed and given us the estimated time that 
component needs to be fixed or replaced.   
Here are some essential terms in Weibull distribution (2-parameter):  



















)𝛽−1 = hazard rate/failure rate.  
𝛽 = shape parameter/slope factor. 





𝛾 = location parameter.  
2) The relationship between those parameters is distinct.  
When 𝛽 < 1, the failure rate is decreasing, which indicates that the 
component is more likely to fail at the early stage of its life. Also, the Weibull 
PDF is the same as the gamma distribution.  
When 𝛽 = 1, the failure rate is constant, which the Weibull PDF will be 
equivalent to the exponential distribution, and the component failed randomly.  
When 𝛽 > 1,  the failure rate is increasing, the component wearing out at an 
increasing rate as time passed.  
When 𝛽 = 2, the failure rate linearly increasing, and the Weibull PDF 
becomes the Rayleigh distribution.  
3) The Weibull CDF equation is:  






If you assume that t= 𝜂, then the CDF reduces to: 
𝐹(𝑡) = 1 −  𝑒−1 = 0.632 
It defined as at which 63.2% of the component has failed.  
In Goldsim, they support Weibull analysis as two different methods to define the best 
fit distribution – one is characteristic life &slope factor, and the other is mean life 
&slope factor. According to the data we have, we used the former one to define our 
failure modes in our reliability model. The slope factor and characteristic life for each 
component present in Table 4 below.  













 2.9 75 
Concrect_Channel_
Inlet-Structu 
 2.9 75 
Scour_protection  3.5 158 
Primary_Spillway_
Gate_Tainter 
Anchorages  4.3 91 
Basic_Structure  3.8 85 
Contro_Cables  4.7 47 
Elevtric_Motors  2.9 45 
Lifting_Cables  3.8 85 
Operationg_Equitm
ent_Mechanical 
Break 3.4 35 
Couplings 4.1 60 




Open gates 4.1 60 
Power_ cable480V  4.7 47 
Seals  4.1 60 
Primary_Spillway_S
ection 
Downstream_Face  4 156 
Gate_Pier  4 156 
Main_Structure  4 156 
Upstream_Face  4 156 
Stilling_Basing 
Basic_Structure  2.9 75 
End_Sill  2.9 75 
Foundation  2.9 75 
Training_Walls  2.7 75 
Turbines 
Exciter   4.8 61 
Governor   2.5 80 
Rotor   4.9 98 
Stator   3.3 62 
Transformer   3.3 66 
Turbine   3 102 
Table 4: Slope factor and characteristic life parameter for each component’s 
summary 
From the table above, only the most internal components have the failure rate. 
However, for the first- or second-order components which dominated by lowest-order 






If the failure rate were constant, then checked the “use simple failure rate instead of 
failure modes” box. Example of the gate’s component – “Primary 
_Spillway_Channel” dialog shown below as Figure 17. 
 
Figure 17: Simple Failure rate checkbox 
4.5.4. Elements dialog summary 
All gates have the same dialog, and so does turbines do. See the dialog detail in 






Figure 18: Spillway Gates and Turbines dialog in GoldSim 
4.5.5. Simulation approach summary 
After finished the modeling, the system runs time simulations in GoldSimTM 
following the flow chart of Figure 19. The realization for our thesis is ten with each 






Figure 19: Monte Carlo simulation flow chart for GoldSimTM 
4.6. Four scenarios  
Based on different maintenance schedules provided by Corps, four scenarios have 





downstream flows, and pool elevations. Each scenario generated based on the data we 
collected as aforementioned.  Again, all the study objectives based on the Garrison 
dam. The conditions for corresponding scenarios explained as following: 
Scenario 1: Assumed the turbine 1 out of work for the first six months and 70 years of 
the simulation was conducted.  
Scenario 2: For this scenario, the Corps wants to see the overall impacts while 
stopping the multiple turbines at once. The simulation time for the model is 70 years, 
and five cases contained in this scenario.  
Case 1: Turbine 1 offline for six months in the beginning. 
Case 2: Turbine 1 and turbine 2 both offline for six months in the beginning.  
Case 3: Turbine 1, turbine 2 and turbine 3 offline together for six months in 
the beginning. 
Case 4: Turbine 1, turbine 2, turbine 3 and turbine 4 offline together for six 
months in the beginning.  
Case 5: All five turbines offline together for six months in the beginning.  
Scenario 3: For this scenario, the turbine 1 will be offline once ten years, and it 
happened in the first year.  The repairing time was last for a year.  The stimulation 





Scenario 4: In this scenario, five cases conducted. In case 1, the turbine 1 was work 
for the first year and offline afterward. Case 2 is based on case 1, but the turbine 2 
was taken out after the second year. Similarly, case 3 was turbine 3 offline after third 
years and remained the same conditions of case 2. And so forth for the rest of the 
cases. All cases simulated in 70 years.  
The change of pool elevations regarding each scenario exhibited in Figure 25. The x-
axis denotes the period of stimulation years while the y-axis is the reservoir elevation 
in feet. Maximum reservoir elevation (Top of the dam) for Garrison found in Missouri 
Mainstem Master Manual 2018, which is 1875ft (Master Water Control Manual, 
2018). Additionally, five legends were defined as below to better view the results.  
Reservoir_Elevation1= Case 1 results happened in the corresponding scenario. For 
example, in Figure 25(2), it represents the results of case 1 in scenario 2.  
Reservoir_Elevation2 = Case 2 results happened in the corresponding scenario. For 
example, in Figure 25(2), it represents the results of case 2 in scenario 2.  
Similarly,  
Reservoir_Elevation3 = Case 3 results happened in the corresponding scenario. 
Reservoir_Elevation4 = Case 4 results happened in the corresponding scenario. 






5. Results and analysis 
The results are divided into two parts. One is the graphic outputs, and the other is the 
reliability statistic results of components. Those results came from our 70-years 
simulation model based on historical inputs. Additionally, the results of replacing with 
stochastic time-series forecasting inflows will be presented at the end of this chapter.  
The results are divided into two parts. One is the graphic outputs, and the other is the 
reliability statistic results of components. Those results came from our 70-years 
simulation model based on historical inputs. Additionally, the results of replacing with 
stochastic time-series forecasting inflows will be presented at the end of this chapter.  
When a simulation is run more than once, somewhat different results are obtained for 
each iteration, because it’s a random process. Consequently, the differences occur 
across the simulations observed.  Given that the current simulations all use the 
historical record of hydrologic inflows there is no variation among the iterations in 
water flow. The main variations occur in the component performance realizations. 
These vary from one 70-year simulation to the next.  
Only ten 70-yr simulations were performed. Thus, the error in the statistical average 
across these iterations is large. Table xx shows these errors in the mean as a function 
of non-parametric and Normal error assumptions. 
The present study, however, has not sought to estimate precise failure rates, but to 
understand trends in the patterns of turbine and spillway failures as a function of 





sets of independent turbines and gates, which to some extent reduces the sampling 
error. Nonetheless, in future studies a greater number of long-time simulations will be 
needed, especially when stochastic as opposed to historically observed reservoir 
inflows are used. 
 





5.1. Graphics results- historical data  
 
Figure 20: Reservoir elevation change results during the 70-year simulation 
(Garrison) 
The results of the simulation of reservoir elevation at every point in time are shown in 
Figure 20. In general, the reservoir pool elevation followed the operating rule 
requirements. The reservoir operates to keep the elevation as close as possible to the 
top of the conservation pool. Obviously, the figure shows two cycles, one is from year 
0 to year 36, and the other from year 36 to year 70. The two cycles are identical since 
our inflow data were repeated. Most of the time, the reservoir elevation fails down to 
normal operation zone, and this means no flood occurs. We could roughly see from our 
results that the reservoir pool elevation reached flood control zone several times in 
every 36 years. Once it happened, the system will evacuate the water to the base of this 





On the other hand, the figure indicated that in 70years, the spillways release happened 
twice (22nd year and 56th year) when the pool elevation exceeded the flood control level, 
and it is evacuated as rapidly as soon to the downstream condition limit in case other 
damages or incidents happen. 
 
Figure 21: Turbine Flow change results during 70-year simulations (Garrison) 
For the 70-year run, it is crucial to analyze the availability of turbines to ensure that it 
generates sufficient power. In the figure of turbines discharge (Figure 20), none of them 
failed in the first thirty years, but after that, they failed intensively. The main reason for 
this is due to the aging of the component. The consequents of turbine failed may bring 
catastrophes. At this point, it reminds the operator that should be ready to schedule 
replacement or maintenance before each time the turbine is about to fail. The failure 
times for each turbine could be overviewed in Table.  
 





Failure counts 9 3 8 4 4 
Table 6: Failure times overview for each dam 
In GoldSimTM, the status output was given in a specific number to indicate the 
component status. Table 5 explained it:  
Output value Component status 
0 All requirements are met, the component is not failed; it is 
turned on and operating. 
1 A preventive maintenance (that makes the component 
inoperable) is underway. 
2 Internal requirements are not met. 
3 External requirements are not met. 
4 Element is not turned on. 
5 The parent element is not operating. 
6 An operating Resource requirement is not met. 
Table 7: Component status number in GoldSimTM (Source: Goldsim user's guide) 
While we take a close look at the details of the turbine fails, the results of the probability 






Figure 22: Probability statistics for Turbine 1 failure 
 







Figure 22 shows a plot of the probability of turbine 1 status. To prepare for the 
consequences of turbine failure is important. It can infer from this plot that operators 
must be on standby once it has the potential likelihood of turbines failed. The operator 
should pay close attention to the first time when the turbine about to fail, which was 
approximately in year 25. Even though it not displayed in Figure 21, it has a high 
likelihood with a rate of 95%.   
On the other hand, it is interesting to notice that in the year when the extreme flood was 
observed (year 56), only turbine 1 failed both before and after that. Figure 23 is the plot 
of the turbine’s status over the two years (year 55 to year 57). It can be seen from Figure 
23 that over the years, turbines worked normally expect turbine 1, which failed twice. 
Therefore, the management needs to ensure that turbine 1 has gone through proper 
maintenance before and after the flood comes.  
Since the value of status (=2) indicated the failure comes from noncompliance with the 
internal requirements, we could observe from Figure 22 and Figure 23 that the reason 
for the turbine failure is mostly because of internal incidents or failures. It is suggesting 
to the operators that they might not need to repair the whole system of turbines but 
rehabilitate one single component. It also saves time on maintenance because 





5.2. Statistics results – historical data   
After we run the model, GoldSim™ automatically represented the reliability metric 
with high-end (95%), mean and low end (5%). Three types of availability and 
reliability outputs can be saved and viewed: 
a. Mean operational availability: it defined the average fraction of time the 
component has been operating over the simulated period.  
b. Mean inherent availability: it means the average fraction of time the 
component has been operable over the simulated period. The inherent 
availability is usually higher than or equal to mean operational availability.  
c. Reliability: it represents the probability that the component will survive for 
the entire simulation.  
The results of the reliability table for gates and turbines attached as Appendix 8.3. 
Note that the reliability may equal to 0 if the component has repeated failures and 
repairs during the simulation.  
From our observing, each gate’s components have high operational availability, 
which nearly 1. It indicates that the system has a strong capacity to operate and 
performs well. However, the existence of several failures impeded the components to 
be fully available. Reliability results were almost equal to 0, confirming failure 
existence. At meanwhile, it reminds the operators that those failures almost the 
repeated problem, so the operators should schedule maintenance in routine. 
In this section, we are also analyzing the reliability of the components in terms of 





failure. The former one understands the time of component available, and the later 
one referred to the repair time they need. Studying these indicators could help us 
understating components failure correctly, and to manage failure in order to reduce 
negative impacts significantly effectively. These two indicators will be explained 
more in the following sections.  
 
Figure 24: Differential of MTTF and MTTR (“Defining Failure,” 2011) 
5.2.1. Failure time statistics 
The component reliability is quantified as Mean Time to Failure (MTTF) and Mean 
Time Between Failure (MTBF). At the same time, the MTTF measures the time 
interval that component has already survived before it fails (which is non-repairable). 
The MTBF represents the time duration between two errors (which is repairable). The 
mean value displayed in GoldSim ‘Failure Time diagram’ is represented to Mean 
Time to Failure. All results dispatched in Appendix 8.4.  
MTTF gave a good likelihood to indicate when the components need to replace. 





idea that stilling basing, which installed in the spillway gate, should be replaced more 
frequently than others. Because its MTTF number is smaller than others, even though 
the sub-components of stilling basing have a longer period of MTTF. At this point, it 
could be noticed that even if a piece of equipment is still running and producing 
items, it has failed if it does not deliver the expected quantities.   
Moreover, the value of MTTF for turbine 1 is 19.87 years. Combining it with our 
previous section, it alerts the operators should pay special attention as the turbine 
approaches the 20th year and ensure that the proper maintenance is provided in 
advance.  
5.2.2. Repair times statistics 
This parameter measures the time to repair the component, and the mean value 
represents the Mean Time to Repair (MTTR). Our system’s results shown in 
Appendix 8.5. Referring to MTTR, the operator could optimize time spent on 
maintenance that reducing MTTR as much as possible to avoid loss of productivity 
due to system unavailability.  
Therefore, considering different maintenance schedules that adjusting the repair time 
(refer to MTTF) and repair period (refer to MTTR) will give us a way to determine 
the best maintenance strategy.   
5.3. Four scenarios results- historical data 
These scenarios are given to us by the Corps (the owner) because they want to know 
what the impact is of scheduling the maintenance in four ways. The results of 





Figure 25(1) Reservoir elevation change in scenario 1. 






Figure 25(3) Reservoir elevation change in scenario 3. 
Figure 25(4) Reservoir elevation change in scenario 4. 
Figure 25: Reservoir elevation change in four different scenarios 
From Figure 25 above, it can observe that scenario 1, scenario 2, and scenario 3 were 
very similar. All of them have two cycles.  However, reservoir elevations have a 
significant difference in scenario 4. First, the range of the elevations in scenario 4 was 























































































































































































































below 1820 ft, while scenario 4 only reaches to 1830ft. Secondly, all of these 
scenarios have the maximum elevation closes to 1850 ft, which is only 10ft below the 
top of the dam. Nevertheless, in the last scenario, the elevation goes up to the 
maximum bond frequently, while this happened only twice for the other three 
scenarios in 70 years simulations. The reason for this phenomenon happened could be 
explained to more power generations we take off and remove them for a long period.  
5.4. Stochastic Time-series  
Besides the uncertainty of the random nature of the stochastic variables in 
components, the uncertainty of streamflow is also vitally important. In order to 
investigate the effects of inflow uncertainty, streamflow forecasting provides a way to 
explore past behavior in the future. For many activities associated with the planning 
and operation of the hydrologic components, the forecast of streamflow will also be 
beneficial to optimize the system.  
The forecasting techniques are varying. Based on time-series approaching, we have 
model tree (MT), artificial neutral network (ANN), autoregressive (AR), 
autoregressive integrated moving average (ARIMA) and autoregressive moving 
average (ARMA) methods to build a streamflow forecast model. Among these 
methods, ARIMA is the most effective approach for time series analysis because it 
allows the user to forecast future even if they do not have related time-series data for 





In our thesis, the Box-Jenkins methodology was used to build an ARIMA model in 
the R language for the seasonal streamflow data taken from the Garrison dam for 36 
years. The steps follow in two parts:  
1. Fitting the models and predictions. 
2. Improving the model 
To better fit our model, we divided the data into two sections of training (=30years) 
and test (=6years) period. After forecasting the aggregate data for six years, we tried 
to find the residuals between the forecasted data and the real data (test data). Based on 
the trends in the residuals, we improved the model to achieve the most precise 
prediction. Similarly, we forecasted the raw data (36 years) for the next 30 years and 
compared it with our training data to get better results. Our ARIMA model for 






Figure 26:Forecasting model for Garrison daily inflow (Source:Afshin Fallahi) 
  






On the other hand, we also took the time -series of outflows from the upstream 
reservoir (Fort Peck) and time-series of inflows to the next reservoir downstream 
(Garrison). And then we moved them in time until we get the maximum correlation. 
This action allows us to get the relatively reasonable ‘travel time’ of the flows 
between two nearby dams. The result of the correlation values shows in Figure 28.  
   
Figure 28: Correlation results 
Based on Figure 28, the best value is between day (-4) and day (-3). It means that 
each value in the upstream dam (Fort Peck) outflow time series can be a predictor of 





Besides, replacing current historical data with our stochastic time series inflow in the 
Garrison Dam is another aspect we tried to analyze the performance of the system. 
The results of 36 years simulation ten times conducted in the following Figure 29.  
 
Figure 29: Time-series model results 
Compared to our general model results, we find the reservoir elevation variance in the 
current model is much less than previously. It only goes to 1844ft and lowers down at 
1832ft. It also could be noticed that the peak of the elevation slightly increases, and it 
might result in increasing inflow in the future. With the possibility of such a trend 
happening in the future, the operators must develop a maintenance schedule advance 
in case multiple failures occur.  
Unfortunately, we have seen the results displayed a lot of cycles, which is abnormal 
in the real-world, and we did not find an alternative way to solve this problem within 
our research time. Thus, some further work that contributes to this problem is needed 









There is a growing tendency to use simulation of dam systems to study dam safety on 
an operational basis. The risk of dam behavior is a complex problem and cannot be 
evaluated just by pure historical data (Rohaninejad & Zarghami, 2012). The causes of 
dam failure are not merely from physical damage, design error, or any other distinct 
reasons, but also unusual combinations of many common things. These unexpected 
combinations triggered by common events, but they do not follow regular operational 
orders.  The contemporary methods usually study dam performance with separate 
failure modes and treat each operational event independently, which limits the 
evaluation of the interaction of system components. The system reliability approach 
addresses these weaknesses using contemporary simulation methods. It does so by 
treating engineered structures and human operation as a system.  
This study presents the framework of how we develop an operational reliability-based 
model. The data outputs of the reliability module enable us to identify the reliability 
and availability of each component, and analysis of the failure caused roots. By 
tracking the structure and nature of interactions among failure mechanisms, it could 
be determining the states of system or subcomponent during the simulation. 
Additionally, referring to the distribution results of MTTF, when the components 
expect to fail have been known, and the distribution of MTTR given information on 
how often components need to repair, both parameters allow the operator to plan 
maintenance and repair time effectively in advance. On the other hand, our four 





Meanwhile, we used the time-series to access the inflow leg between two nearly dams 
and replaced historical data with stochastic time-series inflow.  
To conclude, the results of the thesis can state as follows:  
1. There is no overtopping except two exclusive floods occurred, and there were 
two cycles for the reservoir elevations when we used the historical data from 
Corps engineer.  
2. The turbines and spillways failed mostly consequently from internal reasons. 
3. The first three scenarios came results similarly, and they do not have many 










7. Limitations and future work 
 
Missouri River Mainstem Reservoir system consists of six dams and operates as a 
hydraulically and electrically integrated system. In our thesis, only the biggest dam 
(Garrison) has been studied. The daily inflows discharge influenced by the upper 
dam, and the outflows will affect the downstream dam. Thus, take the Garrison dam 
as a dependent system cannot fully understand the performance of the whole system 
in the Missouri River.  
7.1. Limitations of the current work 
Our model data based on historical records; however, in the real-life that will be more 
complex. Such as the failure modes for each component, we just modeling the 
uncertainty that has happened before or the event we are foreseeable, the probability 
of potential failure may inevitably omit due to lack of knowledge and experience. The 
external disturbance, such as earthquakes, will cause a significant incident to the 
system. We did not consider these natural disasters because we do not have a feasible 
method to accommodate these in our reliability system. Moreover, historical data 
obtained from physical equipment, and unfortunately, measurement errors occur 
commonly.  
The typical problem states in our thesis are the relationship between the powerhead 
and turbine flow. The correlation function is hard to achieve since the points scattered 
located. The initial elevation, pool elevations, and daily inflow discharge were all 
read from historical documentation. Hence, the question about the accuracy of those 





Garrison dam, it still has a large number of points that did not fit this line and 
physical we know the line should be linear.  
On the other hand, the uncertainty in measurement may also cause the spillway rating 
curves to have significant errors at the regular gate opening. This curve typically 
calculated from the discharge coefficient, flow, head, velocity, and width. Those 
paraments are all associate the measurement error, and their error compounds as 
measurements combine into equations (Haug et al., 2014). Since the rating curves are 
important to our gates operation and also related to energy generation, the model we 
developed will be inconsistent with the real system. Except for the measurement 
errors in the rating curve, the other data such as upstream daily inflow, reservoir 
elevation, etc. are all affected by the measurement precision. In further analysis, those 
errors will account for the reliability of the model.  
Regards to those uncertainties in measurement, one suggested solution is defining 
how much risk in original data and then calibrate the existing rating curve. Besides, 
the owner of dams may take a chance to replace them with highly sensitive 
equipment.  
7.2. Future work directions 
The long-term goal for our thesis is to study the performance of the multi-reservoirs 
in multipurpose. To integrate the six mainstem dams as one system to evaluates the 





Our operational reliability-based model develops to assess and manage the risks of 
the dam system operational aspects. However, the risk of dam behavior is also the 
majority caused by external disturbance. Considering how to comply with the 
probabilities of those disturbances to our system’s reliability assessment is one of our 
future work. Additionally, our limited failure modes require more further research on 
understanding the complexity of components of the inherent property and their 
interactions.  In further, the measurement errors were inevitably existing, studying the 
percentile of these uncertainties will provide a way to improve the model system’s 
reliability.  
Moreover, reservoir operation involves a complex set of human decisions depending 
upon hydrologic conditions in the supply network, including watersheds, lakes, 
transfer tunnels, and rivers ((Karamouz & Mousavi, 2003). The uncertainty of inflow 
needs to consider in our reliability model framework. Even though we applied a time-
series approach to forecasting the streamflow, the results did not make sense. 
Studying how to improve our forecast model is another challenge we should focus on 
in the future. Furthermore, the upper reservoir’s outflow is a small portion of the 
inflow for the next reservoir down. Additional resources, such as rainfalls, should 
take into account in our forecast model. However, the way to get adequate data for 
those resources is extremely hard. Thus, finding a new mathematic approach that 
includes the most parameters that affect the uncertainty of inflows is necessary for 























































3. Reliability and availability results summary 
Gates results:  
 
Measure Confidence Bounds 
 5% mean 95% 
Operational Availability 0.96-0.97 0.97 0.97-0.98 
Inherent Availability 0.96-0.97 0.97 0.97-0.98 
Reliability 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
Turbine 1 results:  
 
Measure Confidence Bounds 
 5% mean 95% 
Operational Availability 0.99 1 1 
Inherent Availability 0.99 1 1 






Turbine 2 results:  
 
Measure Confidence Bounds 
 5% mean 95% 
Operational Availability 1 1 1 
Inherent Availability 1 1 1 
Reliability 0 0 0 
 
Turbine 3 results:  
 
Measure Confidence Bounds 
 5% mean 95% 
Operational Availability 0.99 1 1 





Reliability 0 0 0 
 
Turbine 4 results:  
 
Measure Confidence Bounds 
 5% mean 95% 
Operational Availability 1 1 1 
Inherent Availability 1 1 1 
Reliability 0 0 0 
 
Turbine 5 results: 
 
Measure Confidence Bounds 
 5% mean 95% 





Inherent Availability 1 1 1 
Reliability 0 0 0 
 
4. Failure Time results for Garrison dam 
Typical spillway gate (Gate 1 was selected):  
 
 

















5. Repair Time results for Garrison dam 
Typical spillway gate (Gate 1 was selected):  
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